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ABSTRACT: Almost all U.S. hospitals procure their equipment through
group purchasing organizations ("GPOs"). Some hospitals subject the
prices secured by GPOs to a second round of competition in an
"aftermarket, " in which vendors both on and off the GPO contract compete
for the hospital's business. To measure the extent of the potential benefit to
hospitals from another round of competition, we analyzed a database of
approximately 8,100 aftermarket transactions for hospital capital
equipment. The transactions data suggest that hospitals were able to achieve
average savings of approximately 10 to 14 percent across the entire
database (2001 through 2010) and a savings of 15 percent on average for
2010 data. These savings may be attributable to many factors, including the
compensation structure of GPOs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Group purchasing organizations ("GPOs") were originally established by
small hospitals to pool their purchasing power for more favorable contracts
with medical suppliers.' By buying as a group, hospitals should achieve
lower prices and greater discounts than they would if they bought
individually, while also minimizing transaction costs involved in procuring
supplies. Since their inception in the early twentieth century, GPOs have
greatly expanded in size, number, and importance; in 2009 alone, GPOs
negotiated contracts worth $200 to $300 billion,2 and the vast majority of
Editor's note: A 2010 unpublished study by the authors addressed the topic of group
purchasing organizations ("GPOs") and their effect on healthcare costs. The following
article presents new methodology and data to support the authors' views.
1. S. PRAKASH SETHI, INT'L CTR. FOR CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS: AN EVALUATION OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN PROVIDING SERVICES TO
HOSPITALS AND THEIR PATIENTS 6, 17 (2006).
2. Id. at 18. GPO-financed studies indicate that GPO contract-covered purchases
were expected to be worth between $257 to $287 billion by 2009. Sethi independently
estimates the market size to be $218 billion in 2005. Id. According to a report by Locus
Systems, the estimated GPO purchasing volume for 2007 was between $246.3 billion and
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hospitals, nursing homes, and other healthcare institutions rely upon them to
make purchasing decisions.3
Ostensibly, GPOs seek the best products at the lowest prices through a
committee deliberation process in which vendors are selected, based on a
combination of price and quality factors, to supply an entire network of
hospitals.4 GPOs then negotiate contracts with the manufacturers,
distributors, and other suppliers.5 To cover their operating expenses, GPOs
currently charge vendors "administrative" and other fees based on a
percentage of the value of the purchases made by the hospitals through these
contracts.6 Indeed, the vast majority of a GPO's income is from vendors (in
the form of administrative fees) and not from the GPO's hospital members
(in the form of membership dues).
$274.8 billion. See also Locus SYSTEMS, A 2008 UPDATE OF COST SAVINGS AND A
MARKETPLACE ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH CARE GROUP PURCHASING INDUSTRY 11 (2009).
3. SETHI, supra note 1, at 6.
4. Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTHCARE SUPPLY CHAIN Ass'N,
http://www.supplychainassociation.org/?page=FAQ (last visited Dec. 15, 2011)
(formerly Health Indus. Grp. Purchasing Ass'n).
Most healthcare providers make group purchasing selections in a committee
setting, usually comprised of healthcare professionals, such as doctors, nurses
and other clinicians. These committees help determine which medical supplies
are most appropriate from a clinical standpoint. Once a decision is made, GPOs
work to negotiate contracts with healthcare manufacturers, distributors and
other suppliers. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-738, GPOs: SERVICES PROVIDED
TO CUSTOMERS AND INITIATIVES REGARDING THEIR BUSINESS PRACTICES 4 (2010)
("GPOs' sources of revenue include contract administrative fees, other fees obtained
from vendors, and fees resulting from direct charges to customers. According to a 2009
study, on average, GPO contracts account for about 73 percent of nonlabor purchases that
hospitals make"). Id.
7. Id. at 6 ("This fee is designed, in part, to cover a GPO's operating expenses and
serves as its main source of revenue."). Id. Some have questioned whether the GPO
compensation system creates inherent conflicts of interest. Given its dependency on
vendors for financing, a GPO (the "agent") might have an incentive to prioritize the
interests of preferred vendors over the interests of its member hospitals (its "principals").
For example, Professor Einer Elhauge of Harvard Law School has explained how GPOs
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If a GPO is receiving an administrative fee equal to a percentage of the
proceeds, the GPO's incentive to seek out the lowest prices for hospitals is
8weakened. Moreover, in the presence of administrative fees, medical
suppliers might be induced to bid less aggressively on price, as some of their
resources are shifted towards competing for the largest administrative fee.9
The resulting diminution of competition might raise net costs for hospitals
and government-which reimburses hospital expenses through Medicare,
Medicaid, and other programs' 0 -despite the savings in transaction costs
and consolidation of purchasing power made possible by GPOs.
Over the past decade, the government and the media have begun to
scrutinize GPO practices, particularly in the midst of the economic turmoil
and heightened concern over healthcare costs of the last two years.
Following a 2002 New York Times investigation that highlighted GPOs'
have brokered contracts with exclusionary provisions that, in effect, reduce competition
in the supply of medical products. See Hospital Group Purchasing: Lowering Costs at
the Expense of Patient Health and Medical Innovations? Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition of the S. Comm. Of the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 107-899 (2002) (statement of Einer Elhauge submitted for the record); EINER
ELHAUGE, THE EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION FOR HOSPITAL SALES THROUGH GROUP
PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS, REPORT TO U.S. SENATE 20-21 (2002),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo reportjune 02.pdf. See also
MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTEAD TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE:
CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 361-362 (2006) ("buying groups may
serve the interests of the suppliers that provide their funding, not providers, thereby
undermining value-based competition ... [t]here is no valid reason for buying groups to
accept financing or any payments from suppliers."). Id.
8. Another potential incentive problem is that soliciting sales quotes from device
manufacturers and reviewing specifications likely requires effort on the part of the GPO,
and given their compensation scheme, the GPOs internalize all of those costs. This
aspect of the principal-agent problem is similar to the one faced by real estate agents,
who are compensated with a percentage of the sale price. See Steven D. Levitt & Chad
Syverson, Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed: The Value of
Information in Real Estate Transactions 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. W 11053, 2005).
9. See generally Y. NARAHARI ET AL., GAME THEORETIC PROBLEMS IN NETWORK
EcoNoMIcS AND MECHANISM DESIGN SoLUTIONs 266 (2009) (for a primer on bidding in
procurement auctions).
10. SETHI, supra note 1, at 53.
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potential conflicts of interest," Congress initiated a series of hearings to
determine whether further legislation on GPOs was needed.1 In 2005, in
response to this public attention, a collection of GPOs launched the
Healthcare Group Purchasing Industry Initiative ("HGPII").' The HGPII
set forth a set of principles meant to serve as a code of conduct and self-
governance for the GPO industry.14 Still, some worried that HGPII lacked
sufficient specificity, enforcement, and monitoring, to address the public's
concerns. Not satisfied with the self-regulation of GPOs, a group of three
U.S. Senators, Herb Kohl of Wisconsin, Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, and
Bill Nelson of Florida, sent letters in 2009 to the seven largest GPOs.16
They requested information on their business practices and copies of
contracts.17 In September 2010, Senator Grassley's office issued a report
titled Empirical Data Lacking to Support Claims of Savings With Group
Purchasing Organizations, noting that "[b]ased on GAO's findings and the
study constraints identified in the available literature, there is limited data on
the actual savings that may or may not be achieved through GPOs."18
The debate over GPO effectiveness has given rise to numerous studies.
For example, a 2002 Government Accountability Office ("GAO") study
asked whether hospitals paid lower prices on their own or through a GPO
when buying the same model of safety syringe.19 The GAO found that
11. Walt Bogdanich, Medicine's Middlemen; Questions Raised of Conflicts at 2
Hospital Buying Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at A18.
12. Mary Williams Walsh, Senators Investigate Hospital Purchasing, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2009, at Bl.
13. SETHI, supra note 1, at 9.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id.
16. Walsh, supra note 12, at Bl.
17. Id.
18. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 11ITH CONG., EMPIRICAL DATA LACKING TO SUPPORT
CLAIMS OF SAVINGS WITH GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2010) (Sen. Charles E.
Grassley), http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/2010-09-24-GPO-Report.pdf.
19. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA-02-690T, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS-PILOT STUDY SUGGESTS LARGE BUYING GROUPS Do NOT ALWAYS
OFFER HOSPITALS LOWER PRICES 2 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 GAO GPO Study]; Hearing
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median prices were higher by one to five percent through GPOs than outside
them for all safety syringe models and for most pacemaker models.20
According to an investigation by the Los Angeles Times, the prices that
Novation, the largest GPO, charges the University of California on its drug
purchasing contract have been undercut by hundreds of thousands of dollars
by a group of oncologists at UCLA who decided to contract with suppliers
themselves.21
Other recent studies have supported the cost-saving claims of GPOs,
concluding that they do indeed generate savings for member hospitals
relative to a world without GPOs. In 2008, Bums and Lee surveyed hospital
executives in charge of materials management to gauge satisfaction with
GPO utilization, services, and performance. 22 While the study concludes
that GPOs are effective at lowering product prices and reducing the
transaction costs of negotiating contracts, the authors of the study note that
these findings are based on the imperfect knowledge of survey respondents
rather than on empirical cost savings data.23 Similarly, Schneller found that
GPOs save hospitals as much as $36 billion a year based on surveys of
24
hospital administrators2. Additionally, Goldenberg and King calculated
that, in 2008, GPOs saved the U.S. government up to $64 billion-including
$16 to $36 billion in savings to public health care programs-based on
hospital-reported savings of 10 to 18 percent on purchases made through
GPOs.25 Most recently, researchers at Purdue University demonstrated,
Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, and Business and Consumer Rights of
the Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir.
Healthcare Issues).
20. Id. at 11.
21. Michael Hiltzik, Supply Middlemen May Leave Hospitals Ailing, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2005, at Bl.
22. Lawton R. Bums & J. Andrew Lee, Hospital Purchasing Alliances: Utilization,
Services, and Performance, 33 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv. 203, 213 (2008).
23. Id.
24. EUGENE S. SCHNELLER, THE VALUE OF GROUP PURCHASING-2009: MEETING THE
NEEDS FOR STRATEGIC SAVINGS 4 (2009), http://www.novationco.com/
pressroom/industryinfo/valueof gpo_2009.pdf.
25. Locus SYSTEMS, supra note 2, at i (noting that both the Schneller (2009) and
Goldberg and King (2009) studies were commissioned by the Health Indus. Grp.
Purchasing Ass'n (HIGPA)).
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using theoretical models, that the presence of a GPO lowers total purchasing
costs for hospitals; however, hospitals face higher unit prices than they
would if they were to negotiate directly with vendors. 26
Prior studies on the GPO procurement process focused on the savings
realized by a particular hospital or a particular type of medical device. In
contrast, this study provides an empirical analysis of aftermarket
transactions for medical equipment across many types of devices and several
hospitals. To our knowledge, it is the only study of its kind to use actual
hospital transactions as source data. It is also the first paper to examine the
incremental effect of GPO financing. The counterfactual world in prior
GPO studies has been a world without GPOs. In contrast, this study takes
for granted the efficacy (and existence) of GPOs and focuses narrowly on
the price effects relating to GPO financing. It does so by comparing (a) the
price secured by an aftermarket broker whose compensation is not tied to the
auction proceeds with (b) the price of the same device originally secured by
a GPO. We obtained a database from MEMdata-a firm that brokers capital
equipment purchases for hundreds of medical facilities-of over 8,100
aftermarket auctions for medical equipment from GPO contracts. Unlike
most GPOs, MEMdata's compensation is based on a hospital's savings
27relative to some benchmark (typically the GPO contract price).
In Part II, we summarize the database of aftermarket transactions, and we
test whether the hospitals in the transactions database are representative of
the population of U.S. hospitals. In Part III, we analyze the price
improvements afforded to hospitals in the aftermarket. When medical
device purchases are brokered by an intermediary whose compensation is
not tied to auction proceeds, hospitals enjoy an average price reduction of 10
percent (relative to the GPO price) from 2001 through 2010, and an average
26. Total purchasing costs remain the same, according to the authors, because the
higher unit prices are offset by the lower contracting costs associated with GPOs.
Qiaohai (Joice) Hu et al., The Impact of Group Purchasing Organizations on Healthcare-
Product Supply Chains, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management KRANNERT
SCH. OF MGMT., PURDUE UNIV. (forthcoming 2011).
27. See MEMDATA PROGRAMS & SERVICES, http://www.memdata.com/services.php
(follow "Performer" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
MEMdata's eRFP service is a procurement auction process in which all sources
of equipment are identified at the lowest prices through full, fair and free
competitive bidding. You forward all capital proposals for eRFP processing and
simply choose your preferred vendor. MEMdata's fee for Performer is a
percentage of your hard dollar savings. If there are no savings, there is no fee.
Id.
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price reduction of 15 percent in 2010. Using regression analysis, we identify
the factors that explain the variation in savings across the auctions. In Part
IV, we review the policy implications of our findings and consider the
limitations of our analysis.
II. THE DATABASE OF AFTERMARKET TRANSACTIONS
We obtained a database of approximately 8,100 aftermarket medical
device transactions between 2001 and 2010 from MEMdata,28 a firm that
conducts procurement auctions for GPO-member hospitals seeking to
improve upon the prices offered by the incumbent suppliers on the GPO
contract.29 As noted above, unlike most GPOs, whose compensation is tied
to contract revenues, MEMdata is compensated according to the savings
realized by the hospital. Before availing themselves of aftermarket options
with MEMdata, many hospitals undertake significant additional negotiation
efforts (for example, taking advantage of promotions and clearances),
thereby limiting the potential for savings. MEMdata's procurement auction
process is delivered from an online platform called electronic Request For
Proposal ("eRFP"). Vendor proposals are processed electronically and
archived in a proprietary database.
The database contains competitive bids for a range of capital equipment-
defined as medical supplies expected to last for more than twelve months.
30
Competitive bids are those from suppliers not on the GPO contract. The
"awarded price" (that is, the winning bid) in the transaction database ranges
from $29.95 (for an oximeter thermometer) to $2.8 million (for an Intensity
Modulated Radiation Therapy system). The categories of capital equipment
in the database include: biomedical, dietary, imaging, information
technologies, laboratory, laundry, monitoring, oncology, physical therapy,
28. The mere participation in an aftermarket transaction does not affect a member
hospital's eligibility to remain in the GPO; rather, purchasing some supplies off the GPO
contract typically results in pricing penalties on remaining items purchased on the GPO
contract. See infra Part IV.
29. In supplying the transaction data, MEMdata required strict non-disclosure rules
be followed and that no pricing associated with any vendor, GPO, hospital, or equipment
models be disclosed.
30. While hospitals often incur penalties from buying off the GPO contract (for
example, hospitals typically pay higher prices for not meeting share-based requirements
or for not complying with a bundled rebate, and are sometime forced to return prior
rebates), most GPO contracts do not explicitly bar them from doing so. All of the
hospitals in our transactions database belong to GPOs.
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plant, storage, surgery, telecom, and vehicles. Although these categories
span a diverse range of equipment, most categories account for a very small
percentage of transactions in our database, as illustrated in Table I below.
When a product can be categorized, the most common categories are
biomedical, surgery, and imaging equipment.


































































An observation in the database of aftermarket transactions includes the
auction number and date; hospital name, size, and zip code; type and
quantity of devices required by the hospital; original GPO price from the
incumbent supplier by device type; the bids of rival device companies by
device type; and the savings achieved by the hospital. As each observation
is a separate auction, hospitals may be repeated across multiple observations.
For example, if a hospital procures ten different items in the aftermarket, the
hospital appears ten times in the database (no many how many units of each
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item was purchased). Supplemental data on the hospitals, including the type
of facility and total patient revenue, were obtained from the American
Hospital Directory ("AHD"). Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the
variables in the combined database.
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES
Variable Obs. Sample Sample Std. Minimum Maximum
Mean Dev.
Hospital staffed beds 7,294 134 149 4 799
Number of competitive 8,110 2.7 1.9 1 31
bids
Hospital patient 7,294 $294 million $563 million 0 $3.38 billion
revenues
Hospital net income 7,294 $503,034 $18.3 million -$120 $148 million
million
GPO price 8,110 $81,436 $249,080 $1 $4.81 million
Awarded price 8,110 $73,990 $227,041 $0 $5.29 million
Notes: We were able to match a hospital in the transactions database to the
AHD database in 7,294 auctions or approximately 90 percent of all auctions
in the transactions database (280 out of 341 hospitals). In cases where the
"awarded price" field was blank (about 40 percent of the records), we
populated it with the lowest competing non-incumbent bid.
As Table 2 shows, the average hospital in the transactions database had
134 beds, $503,034 in annual net income, and $294 million in annual patient
revenues. The average incumbent price was $81,436, and the average
awarded price was $73,990. On average, the aftermarket auction induced
2.7 competitive bids.
To determine whether the sample of hospitals in the aftermarket
transaction data was representative of the larger population of U.S. hospitals,
we compared the means of the hospitals' characteristics in the transactions
database with the same characteristics in the AHD database of 6,971 U.S.
hospitals in Table 3.
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TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF MEAN OF HOSPITALS FROM TRANSACTIONS
SAMPLE WITH U.S. POPULATION OF HOSPITALS
Staffed Beds Total Patient Net IncomeRevenues
Mean value from the AHD 135 $277 million -$126,127
database (p)
Standard deviation from the AHD 267 $553 million $73.6million
database (a)
Mean value from the transactions 127 $254 million $2.4million
database (M)
Sample observations (n) 280 280 280
Standard error of the mean
SE = / In 15.96 $33 million 
$4.4 million
z statistic
z =(M-p) / SE -0.501 -0.697 0.574
As Table 3 illustrates, the means of the sample and the population of U.S.
hospitals are fairly similar. The mean number of hospital beds from the
sample of transaction data is 127, which is 0.501 standard error units from
the population mean of 135.31 One cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
hospitals in the transactions database are comparable to a simple random
sample from the population of U.S. hospitals. The same conclusion is true
for total patient revenues and net income.32 Accordingly, we conclude that
our sample is not significantly different from the entire population of
hospitals in terms of these characteristics. It is also worth noting that the
hospitals in the transaction database are located in 41 distinct U.S. states,
which suggests that most regions of the country are represented.
To determine whether the GPOs in the transactions database were
representative of the population of GPOs, we compared the identity of GPOs
in the transactions database with a list of GPOs by market share. According
to the GAO, the top seven GPOs control 85 percent of the market share.
31. Using the z-score, a measure of the distance in standard deviations of a sample
from the mean, we find that the probability of observing a standard normal value below -
0.501 is approximately 0.309. The two-sided p-value is approximately 0.618 (twice the
one-sided p-value). Accordingly, with probability I -0.618 = 0.382, a simple random
sample of 280 hospitals would have a mean test score within 8 (equal to 127 - 135) units
of the population mean.
32. The corresponding z-scores are -0.697 and 0.574, respectively.
33. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-998T, USE OF CONTRACTING
PROCESSES AND STRATEGIES TO AWARD CONTRACTS FOR MEDICAL-SURGICAL PRODUCTS 4
(2003).
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Based on an annual survey of GPOs conducted by Modern Healthcare, S.
Prakash Sethi computed the relative share of 16 survey respondents (plus
Consorta), which collectively comprise 98 percent of all purchases made
through GPOs. 34 This analysis reveals that the top two GPOs (Premier and
Novation) accounted for slightly over 50 percent of purchases in 2005; the
top four GPOs (Premier, Novation, MedAssets, and Broadlane) accounted
for slightly less than 75 percent; and the top ten (Premier, Novation,
MedAssets, Broadlane, Amerinet, Health Trust, Consorta, HealthCare
Purchasing Partners, GNYHA, and Innovatix) accounted for approximately
98 percent. 3 5  Table 4 shows the GPOs that are represented in the
transactions database.
TABLE 4: GPOs REPRESENTED IN THE TRANSACTIONS DATABASE
GPO Name (Rank) Represented? GPO Name (Rank) Represented?
Premier (1) Yes GNYHA (9) Yes
Novation (2) Yes Innovatix (10) Unknown
MedAssets (3) Yes AllHealth (11) Unknown
Broadlane (4) Yes Hospital Purchasing Service (12) Unknown
Amerinet (5) Yes Yankee Alliance (13) Unknown
Health Trust (6) Yes Resource Optimization (14) Yes
Consorta (7) Yes Child Health Corp. (15) Yes
HealthCare Purchasing Yes National Capital Area Shared Unknown
Partners (8) Services (16)
Services Healthcare (17) Yes
As Table 4 shows, 12 of the top 17 GPOs are represented in the
transactions database. Accordingly, the population of U.S. GPOs appears to
be well represented in the transactions database. MEMdata did not keep an
electronic record of the identity of the GPO for each aftermarket transaction,
which prevents us from testing the hypothesis that some GPOs are better at
securing lower prices than others.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AFTERMARKET DATA
We now turn to estimating the savings (relative to the GPO-negotiated
price) realized by hospitals on capital equipment purchases when the
broker's compensation is not tied to auction proceeds. We also explain the
variation in the savings across the auctions in the database. Before
identifying explanatory variables, we first summarize the savings achieved
34. SETHI, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Cinda Becker, Of Two Minds, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Aug. 15, 2005, at S l-S5).
35. Id. at 23 (Exhibit 2).
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by hospitals in the transactions database in Table 5. These savings are
calculated by comparing the lowest GPO incumbent price to the awarded
price (or, when awarded price field is blank, the lowest competing non-
incumbent bid) for each auction. Each savings computation corresponds to a
single transaction in the database, and is thus a one-time savings and not
ongoing. To be as conservative as possible, we included all observations for
the purpose of making these savings calculations. In a handful of
observations (1.4 percent), the percent savings were negative-that is, the
hospital ended up spending more on the device than the GPO-negotiated
price, 21.7 percent of auctions provided no savings, and 76.9 percent
provided positive savings.36  Positive savings amounts indicate that the
awarded price was less than the GPO-negotiated price. Including cases
where the aftermarket auction did not produce any price improvement for
the hospital tends to bias our average savings estimate downward.
Table 5 contains average savings amounts as well as percentages across
all years from 2001 to 2010. It includes both our conservative estimates,
which include negative and zero percent savings observations, as well as
averages across observations with positive savings only. We include this
second set of numbers because negative savings almost always indicate data
anomalies or instances where the hospital chose to spend more money on a
higher quality item; similarly, zero savings might mask a potential increase
in utility to the hospital that is not quantifiable through price data. For
example, an incumbent may have issued a revised bid for the same price, but
with the addition of free shipping or installation. Competitive bids such as
this would produce zero price savings according to the transactions database,
even though actual savings were achieved.
TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF AVERAGE SAVINGS, 2001-2010
Conservative Conservative Average Savings Average Percent
Average Savings Average Percent Amount Savings
Amount Savings (Positives Only) (Positives Only)
$7,446 10% $10,039 14%
According to these results, the aftermarket transactions afforded hospitals
in the database an average savings of 10 percent by conservative estimates,
and 14 percent if we exclude negative and zero savings observations, off the
GPO-negotiated price.
36. If a hospital seeks out an intermediary to achieve a savings, but if that
intermediary is not successful in generating a lower bid, then the hospital most likely
would remain with the incumbent supplier.
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Next, we identify through regression analysis the factors that determine
the magnitude of these savings for a given auction. Our model includes
hospital fixed effects, as hospitals are repeated across multiple observations
in the dataset, as well as indicators for year and device type. The model
further illustrates whether there were multiple incumbent suppliers on the
GPO contract (that is, the entrant had to improve on the lowest of two GPO
prices), whether the incumbent(s) lowered its initial bid, and total number of
rival bids and total number of rival bids squared. 37 The fixed-effects can be
used to determine whether any hospital enjoys savings significantly above or
below the average savings enjoyed by all hospitals in the database,
controlling for all other factors. To filter out data anomalies and possible
errors, we excluded auctions containing outliers in terms of total rival bids
and percent savings from our regression analyses. Outliers were defined as
observations that are either less than the first quartile minus 1.5 times the
interquartile range, or above the third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile
range. The results are presented in Table 6.
TABLE 6: REGRESSION RESULTS
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE= PERCENT SAVINGS)
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t statistic
Total Rival Bids 0.0200*** 0.0027 7.3
Total Rival Bids Squared -0.0013*** 0.0004 -3.44
Single Incumbent 0.0403*** 0.0056 7.25
Incumbent Lowered Bid 0.0160*** 0.0026 6.18
Year 2002 0.0065 0.0186 0.35
Year 2003 0.0086 0.02 0.43
Year 2004 -0.0233 0.0196 -1.19
Year 2005 -0.0203 0.0198 -1.02
Year 2006 -0.0233 0.0193 -1.21
Year 2007 -0.0211 0.0192 -1.1
Year 2008 -0.0169 0.0195 -0.87
37. We observed that the incremental effect of an additional bid was not constant-
that is, the first few rival bids are more powerful than the last.
38. Outliers are identified using definitions found in standard statistics textbooks.
See, e.g., RAND R. WILCox, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN STATISTICAL METHODS:
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING POWER AND ACCURACY 32-34 (2d ed. 2010).
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Explanatory Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t statistic
Year 2009 -0.0232 0.0195 -1.19
Year 2010 0.0013 0.0201 0.07
Category Biomedical -0.0091 0.0063 -1.44
Category Cardio Fitness Equipment -0.0961*** 0.0069 -13.97
Category Compression -0.0169** 0.006 -2.82
Category Dietary 0.0131 0.0105 1.24
Category Imaging 0.003 0.0061 0.49
Category Information Technologies -0.0099 0.008 -1.24
Category Laboratory -0.0012 0.0065 -0.18
Category Laundry 0.0179 0.0245 0.73
Category Monitoring 0.0057 0.0078 0.73
Category Oncology 0.0321** 0.0107 3.01
Category Patient Assistance Device -0.0196 0.0337 -0.58
Category Patient Positioning -0.0379*** 0.0072 -5.22
Category Physical Therapy -0.0012 0.0106 -0.11
Category Plant 0.0123 0.0131 0.94
Category Storage 0.0128 0.0128 I
Category Stress Test Systems 0.0347 0.039 0.89
Category Surgery 0.0001 0.007 0.01
Category Telecom 0.0119 0.0163 0.73
Category Vehicles -0.023 0.0121 -1.9
constant 0.0147 0.0213 0.69
Notes: Hospital indicators are not shown above (significant for 281 out of
338 hospitals). Reference groups for years and categories are 2001 and 'No
Category,' respectively. Outliers for total rival bids and percent savings
have been dropped. R-squared equal to 0.16. Number of observations equal
to 7,314. Asterisks are used to indicate significance of coefficients: * for
p<.05, ** for p<.O1, and *** for p<.001.
As Table 6 shows, rival bids exert downward pressure on the awarded
price (and thus increase the percent savings) at a decreasing rate, increasing
percent savings by an average of 1.7 percentage points (equal to 2% + 2 x
-0.13% x 1) for the first competitive bid and by an additional 1.5
percentage points (equal to 2% + 2 x -0.13% x 2) for the second
competitive bid and so on. Similarly, if an auction involves a single
incumbent-that is, there was only one incumbent price to beat-then
savings increase by four percentage points on average. Presumably, this
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effect occurs because lone incumbents are more insulated from competition;
therefore, their original prices will be higher than those offered when the
hospital has another readily available option. Because higher starting prices
leave more room for savings through solicitation of rival bids, the coefficient
is positive. The coefficient on incumbent lowered bid, which indicates
whether the incumbent on the GPO contract was induced to submit a revised
bid that improved upon its initial offer, is also positive and significant at the
five percent level.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
GPOs play an important role in brokering transactions between hospitals
and medical device suppliers. Our empirical findings suggest that hospitals
can achieve significant savings relative to the GPO-negotiated price through
participation in medical-device aftermarkets. To the extent that the savings
relative to the GPO-negotiated price are attributable to the broker's
compensation-and not to some other factor that we failed to control for-
our findings could lend support for reforming the way in which GPOs are
financed. According to economic theory, the current GPO compensation
system could induce GPOs to preserve some degree of pricing power for
their preferred vendors. A more competitively priced fixed administrative
fee means less compensation for GPOs. If GPOs were prevented from
receiving administrative fees from medical suppliers, which could be
achieved by removing the safe harbor from the anti-kickback statute, then
GPOs would likely structure their procurement process in a way that elicited
more competitive bidding, resulting in lower prices and greater competition.
Importantly, as our preferred approach would merely alter the financing of
GPOs, any efficiencies that GPOs currently offer, including reduced
transactions costs or consolidated buying power, would be preserved.
Despite both the economic and statistical significance of our results, there
are a few remaining validity concerns and caveats. First, the observed
savings might be driven in part by sample selection-that is, hospitals that
seek out savings in the aftermarket, and thereby appearing in this database,
are more likely to achieve lower prices than hospitals that do not seek out
savings in the aftermarket. Schneller mentions that hospitals may "utilize
GPO pricing as benchmarking and utilize GPO contract pricing to achieve
custom contracting for their organizations."39  However, a selection
hypothesis would require that hospitals know when they are not getting the
best prices; in the absence of any available benchmark for comparison, this
alternative explanation seems unlikely. The selection hypothesis is further
strained by our finding that over 20 percent of auctions in the transactions
39. SCHNELLER, supra note 24, at 15.
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database generated no savings relative to the GPO price, suggesting that
hospitals do not know when they are not getting the best price.
Second, it is also important to note that price is not the only factor that
differentiates one- contract from another. Hospitals must also consider
service agreements, clauses regarding product guarantees and return
policies, service level agreements, possible rebates, and other add-ons not
captured by price.40  To the extent that these non-price factors are not
controlled for in our regressions (and are correlated with the awarded price),
our estimated savings could be upwardly biased. That said, these terms may
be just as negotiable as price and similarly improved upon in the aftermarket
setting. Thus, it is unclear whether and in which direction these unobserved
factors could bias our results.
A third, and final, limitation of this analysis is its focus on the
procurement of capital equipment. Although GPOs are intimately involved
in the procurement of capital equipment, they broker other types of
41materials, particularly commodities and pharmaceuticals,41 which we were
not able to analyze due to lack of data. It is uncertain to what extent our
findings would be valid across these other types of purchases. A future path
of research would be to obtain a comparable database of aftermarket
transactions for other types of medical devices.
40. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE
OF COMPETITION 3 (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf
("Although CMS uses an administered pricing system for Medicare, hospitals engage in
non-price competition to attract Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, and engage in
price and non-price competition for private payors and patients. As detailed below,
competition in the market for hospital inpatient services has enhanced quality and
lowered prices."). Id.
41. SCHNELLER, supra note 24, at 24. See also Bums & Lee, supra note 22, at 211.
